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Hellerstein: Criminal Law Decisions

IT WAS A VERY GOOD YEAR - FOR THE
GOVERNMENT: THE SUPREME COURT'S
MAJOR CRIMINAL RULINGS OF THE 1995-1996
TERM
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
Our next speaker is Professor William Hellerstein. Professor
Hellerstein was the chief of the Appeals Bureau of the Legal Aid
Society. I have obviously had an opportunity to judge the
capabilities of various appellate lawyers and appeals bureaus, and
at least for the era when I served, certainly the Appeals Bureau of
the Legal Aid Society was the best of the bureaus, including all
of the ten district attorney's offices which are in the Second
Department. He managed a great appeals bureau and is a great
appellate lawyer. His recognition across the state is confirmed by
the fact that on four occasions his name was sent to the Governor
as a prospective appointee to the New York Court of Appeals. So
on four occasions, at least, the nominating commission,
recognized him as one of the seven best qualified people to serve
on the New York's highest court. Unfortunately, the government
did not recognize him as the most qualified, but we know all
about the biases of the new executives when they make
appointments. In the meantime, he is a leading authority on the
constitutional aspects of criminal law, and the Supreme Court's
view of it.
ProfessorWilliam E. Hellerstein:1
The 1995-1996 Term was a cornucopia of goodies for law
enforcement. The government prevailed in most of the major
cases, and also enjoyed a significant rejuvenation of its ability to
utilize civil forfeiture as a crime-fighting instrument. Conversely,
the few victories that were had by the defense were pretty one1. Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; Juris Doctor. Harvard Law
School (1962).
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sided and generally declarative of resolutions that were rather
obvious.
I. CIVIL FORFEITURE
Commencing in 1989, to the surprise of many and to the
dismay of the government, the Court decided three cases that
cabined significantly the government's use of civil forfeiture in
its war on crime. In United States v. Halper,2 the Court held for
the first time that a civil action for forfeiture could be so
disproportionate to the size of a defendant's theft that it could
constitute a second punishment for the crime and thereby violate
the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. 3 Four years
later, in Austin v. United States,4 the Court held for the first time
that a civil forfeiture of property linked to a drug crime may be
so disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime that it violates
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 5 The
following year, in Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth
Ranch, 6 the Court held that a state tax on marijuana, one that was
imposed only upon a person after he or she has been arrested for
a crime pertaining to marijuana, could be so punitive as to
constitute double jeopardy if the tax statute "was motivated by a
penal and prohibitory intent rather than the gathering of
revenue. ' 7 This trilogy of cases, and several others of lesser
2. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).

3. Id. at 452. In Halper, the defendant was convicted of defrauding
Medicare of $595.00 and sentenced to 2 years in prison and fined $5,000.00.

Id. at 437. The government then brought a forfeiture proceeding to impose a
civil penalty of an additional $130,000.00. Id. at 438. See U.S. CONST.
amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "nor shall any

person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb ..... Id.
4. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).

5. Id. at 622. See U.S. CONST. amend VIII. The Eighth Amendment
provides: "excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id.
6. 511 U.S. 767 (1994).
7. Id. at 1955. In Kurth Ranch, the defendants were convicted of various
drug offenses after state police officers raided their farm. Id. at 1942.
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import, 8 appeared to signal a growing resistance by the Court to

the expansive use of the civil forfeiture remedy by law
enforcement authorities. In fact, three years ago, at this podium,
I stated that the Court had evinced such a proclivity. 9 However,
those who believed as I did that the Court was on a roll against
expanded use of forfeiture got a rude awakening this term. In a
five to four decision in Bennis v. Michigan,10 the Court held that
neither the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment I
nor the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment 12 requires an
Subsequent to their arrest, the state revenue department attempted to collect a
state tax imposed on the marijuana and the various paraphernalia used in
connection with the drug. Id. The defendants challenged the constitutionality
of the state tax. Id. at 1943. The Court noted that all criminal and civil
sanctions are subject to constitutional restraints. Id. In analyzing the statute,
the Court observed that it applies when the defendant has committed a crime
but before an actual conviction, Id. at 1947, and that it is imposed "on the
possession and storage of dangerous drugs ... when the taxpayer neither owns
nor possesses when the tax is imposed." Id. at 1948. The Court concluded that
the tax was not remedial in nature and therefore constituted a second
punishment for the same offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Id.
8. See Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993); United States
v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993) (limiting the interpretation
of the "relation back" provision of the forfeiture statute to allow government
ownership only after there is a forfeiture decree); Republic National Bank of
Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 87-9 (1992) (government's quick
movement of a res after winning a forfeiture judgment does not prevent the
court of appeals from entertaining an appeal by the claimant since in rem
forfeiture was designed to "expand the reach of the parties and to furnish
remedies for aggrieved parties"); United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993) (absent exigent circumstances, notice and an
adversary hearing are required before the government may seize real property
that is allegedly subject to forfeiture under the drug laws).
9. See William E. Hellerstein, Calmer Seas: 77Te Supreme Court's Major
Criminal Law Rulings of the 1993-94 Term, 11 ToURO L. REv. 361, 383
(1995).
10. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996),
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides
in pertinent part: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. .. ." Id.
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innocent owner defense. 13 The second alarm that rang came in
UnitedStates v. Ursery, 14 which held that nothing in the Court's
recent forfeiture decisions had altered the Court's long-held view

that in rem civil forfeitures are neither punishment nor criminal
actions for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 15
Bennis drew the most press attention because Mrs. Bennis's

husband was caught receiving oral sex from a prostitute in a 1977
Pontiac that was jointly owned by him and his wife.

16

Under a

Michigan nuisance law that was intended to curb prostitution in
cars,

17

the car was forfeited, including Mrs. Bennis's half-

interest in it. 18 Unlike many other in rem forfeiture statutes,
including those enacted by Congress, and Michigan's own drug
forfeiture statutes, the nuisance statute does not contain an

innocent owner defense. Mrs. Bennis challenged the absence of
such a defense as a violation of due process; she asserted that not
only did she not engage in any wrongdoing, she did not even
know what her husband was doing with their jalopy. 19

Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the
inclusion of an "innocent owner" defense was not required, 20 that

a long and unbroken line of cases shows that an owner's interest
12. U.S. CONST. amend V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." Id.
13. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001.
14. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
15. Id. at 2149.
16. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996.
17. Id. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.3801 (1988). This statute provides
in pertinent part: "Any building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or plane used for the
purpose of lewdness, assignation or prostitution or gambling or kept for the
use of prostitutes or other disorderly persons .... is declared a nuisance....
and all . . . nuisances shall be enjoined and abated as provided in the court
rules." Id. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.3825 (1) (1988). This section states in
pertinent part: "If the existence of the nuisance is established in an
action ... an order of abatement shall be entered as part of the judgment in
the case, which order shall direct the removal ... [and] direct the sale thereof
in the manner provided for the sale of chattels under execution ...... Id.
18. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996.
19. Id. at 998.
20. Id.
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can be forfeited 21 (his citations included cases dating back to
early nineteenth century Admiralty cases),22 and that in two
23
recent cases, the Court had upheld forfeitures of conveyances.
The Court's reliance on Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Company, 24 the most recent decision, is very interesting because
Mrs. Bennis's attorneys also relied on it. 25 Why? Because in
Calero-Toledo, the Court stated specifically that "it would be
difficult to reject the constitutional claim of ... an owner who
proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the
wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably
could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his
property.' 26 This suggested that an innocent owner defense did
exist and Mrs. Bennis sensibly relied on this statement. 27 Well,
the Chief Justice said that the language was dicta and inconsistent
with the actual holding of the case. 2 8 I believe it was Justice
Holmes who once responded to an attorney's assertion that
language in a previous decision was mere dictum by stating "We
said it, didn't we?" Obviously, that did not work for Mrs. Bennis
here.
Mrs. Bennis also argued that an innocent owner defense could
be discerned from Austin and Foucha v. Louisiana,29 a case that
involved the confinement of persons acquitted by reason of
insanity and which, she argued, supports the proposition that it is

21. Id. See Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926); Dubbins Distillery
v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 401 (1878).

22. Id. at 998. See, e.g., Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. 210 (1844):
The Palmyra, 15 U.S. 1 (1827).
23. Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co.. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
24. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
25. Bennis, 116 S.Ct. at 999.
26. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689.
27. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999.

28. Id. In Calero-Toledo, the Court held that the possession of the yacht
was voluntarily entrusted to the lessees, and that no allegation had been made

or proof offered that the company did all that it reasonably could to avoid
having its property put to an unlawful use. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 690.
29. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
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unfair to punish a person who is blameless. 30 The Chief Justice
responded that both cases had only a tangential relation to the
innocent owner defense, 3 1 and he doubted the extent to which a
forfeiture proceeding is punishment, pointing out that the
Michigan statute served the deterrent purpose of interdicting
prostitution. 32 He added that, viewed properly as a nuisance
abatement statute, the law resembled laws against dangerous
driving that render car owners civilly liable for damage done by
33
negligent operators to whom they have entrusted their cars.
The most startling aspect of Bennis is that it was Justice
Ginsburg's vote that sank Mrs. Bennis. In a brief concurrence,
Justice Ginsburg minimized what was at stake. Noting that the
car belonged to Mr. Bennis as much as it did to his wife, she
pointed out that the only issue was whether Mrs. Bennis was
entitled to a portion of the proceeds from a sale of the car and not
whether she was entitled to the car itself. 34 Moreover, the
Michigan Supreme Court considered the nuisance abatement
proceeding an equitable action, which to Justice Ginsburg meant
that the court would police exorbitant applications of the
Michigan law. 35 Lastly, she found nothing unfair about the trial
judge's refusal to order a division of sale proceeds for the car,
given that it was eleven years old and had been bought by the
36
Bennises for six hundred dollars.
Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Souter and Breyer) dissented
and he did not let Justice Ginsburg off lightly. He questioned her
confidence in the Michigan Supreme Court's readiness to
interdict inappropriate applications of the statute because it failed
to do so in the instant case. 3 7 Moreover, for him, the car's
modest value did not offset the unfairness of using Mrs. Bennis's
30. Id. at 77-78. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983);
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
31. Bennis, 116 S.Ct. at 1000.
32. Id.
33. id.
34. Id. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1009, n. 14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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property to compensate for her husband's offense. 38 He
distinguished between forfeitures of contraband and forfeitures of
instrumentalities and he pointed out that there was not a strong
enough connection between the Bennis's car and the act of
prostitution committed in it for Mrs. Bennis's interest in the car
to be forfeited. 39 He also believed that the Court had made a
significant retreat from Austin, which he thought had rejected in
40
rem forfeiture for totally blameless owners.
Justice Kennedy's separate dissent argued that cars were not
boats and that forfeitures pursuant to admiralty and maritime
tradition were a pragmatic resolution of the need to find "some
source of compensation for injuries done by a vessel whose
responsible owners were often half a world away and beyond the
reach of the law and its processes. "41 He emphasized that
Admiralty forfeitures could continue without extending them to
the automobile, "which is a practical necessity in modem life for
so many people. " 42
Because Justice Ginsburg's vote was crucial, the question
remains whether she would have decided differently had the
Bennis's car had been a 1996 Maserati. Probably not. Her
receptivity to Michigan's decision to deter men from using the
family car for illicit sexual encounters seems to transcend a car's
value. 43 From this, I deduce the emergence of a feminist
perspective. And, I do not mean to be critical. But I think she
does not have great sympathy for Johns "getting a free ride," if
you pardon the expression. However, the issue in Bennis was not
whether Michigan should not be permitted to deter and punish
Johns by confiscating their cars. It was whether, after taking and
38. Id.

39. Id. at 1006-07. Justice Stevens conceded the illegal activity occurred in
the car, but, "it might just as well have occurred in a multitude of other
locations." Id. at 1006.
40. Id. at 1004-06.
41. Id. at 1010-11 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 1011.
43. Id. at 1003. "Michigan has decided to deter Johns from using cars they

own (or co-own) to contribute to neighborhood blight, and that abatement
endeavor hardly warrants this Court's disapprobation." Id.
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selling a car, the state should be allowed to keep the innocent co44
owner's share of the proceeds.
In United States v. Ursery,45 the Court reversed the 6th and 9th
Circuits for their mistaken reliance on the Halper-Austin-Kurth
Ranch trilogy in concluding that the Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits the government from convicting a defendant for a
criminal offense and forfeiting his property for that same offense
in a separate civil proceeding. 46 With Justice Stevens the lone
dissenter in one of the two cases the Court, 47 in an opinion by
the Chief Justice, held that nothing in those decisions had
changed the Court's long-held view that in rem civil forfeitures
are neither punishment nor criminal actions within the
contemplation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 48 Those who
believed otherwise, he said, had overlooked an entire line of
cases that antedated Halper and which had long recognized that
parallel in rem forfeiture actions and criminal prosecutions were
commonplace. 49 The Chief Justice pointed out that in Various
Items of Personal Property v. United States, 50 the Court had
specifically approved coincidental in rem forfeiture proceedings
and criminal prosecutions under the Double Jeopardy Clause
44. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., A Car is Not a Pirate Ship, THE AMERICAN
LAWYER, April 1996, at 39-40. Noteworthy also is the contrast between
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence and that of Justice Thomas. Taylor points out
that "[u]nlike Thomas--whose shparate concurrence acknowledged the
unfairness to Mrs. Bennis and expressed concern about possible abuse of
forfeiture laws 'to raise revenue from innocent but hapless owners'--Ginsburg
evinced neither sympathy nor concern." Id. at 39.
45. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
46. See United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995); United

States v. $405,089.23 in United States Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir.
1994), 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995). Both cases were consolidated in the
Supreme Court for argument.
47. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2152. In Ursery, Justice Stevens dissented as a
result of the defendant's house having been forfeited due to the discovery of
marijuana found within it, however, he concurred in the companion case
because the funds forfeited were the proceeds of unlawful activity that the
claimants had no right to retain. Id. at 2152-53.
48. Id. at 2144-47.
49. Id. at 2144.
50. 282 U.S. 577 (1931).
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when it contrasted in rem proceedings against "guilty" property

with in personam proceedings against the guilty person and
concluded the forfeiture is not part of the punishment for the
crime. 5 1 He further noted that in United States v. One Assortment
of 89 Firearms,52 decided 53 years later, the Court reaffirmed
the Various Items approach and developed a two prong test for
determining whether an in rem forfeiture qualifies as punishment:
(1) whether Congress intended the forfeiture to be criminal and
punitive or, civil and remedial and, (2) whether the scheme is so
punitive in purpose and effect as to negate Congress' intent. 53 He
concluded that as to both drug forfeitures and money laundering
54
forfeitures, Congress intended to have them governed civilly.
As to the second prong, although he conceded that the forfeitures
may have some punitive aspects, he emphasized that they also
serve important nonpunitive goals, such as "encourag(ing]
property owners to take care in managing their property and
ensur[ing] that they will not permit the property to be used for
illegal purposes." 55 Insofar as the statutes authorize the forfeiture
of proceeds of criminal activity, he added, they "serve the
additional nonpunitive goal of ensuring that persons do not profit
from their illegal acts. ' 56 He distinguished Halper because it
involved civil penalties, not civil forfeitures and explained that
civil forfeitures are designed to do more than simply compensate
the Government -- they serve "to confiscate property used in

violation of the law, and to require disgorgement of the fruits of
illegal conduct., 57 He distinguished Austin on the ground that it
was limited to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment, 5 8 and Kurth Ranch on the ground that it was the
functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution, insofar
as the Montana tax had been conditioned on the commission of a
51. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2140.
52. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).

53. Ursery, 116S. Ct. at 2142.
54. Id. at 2147-48.

55. Id. at 2148.
56. Id. at 2147-48.
57. Id. at 2145.
58. Id. at 2146.
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crime, was imposed only after the taxpayer had been arrested,
and taxed the marijuana at a time when it was not owned by the
taxpayer. 59
Justice Stevens, while conceding that proceeds of a crime are
not property that one has a right to retain, argued that forfeiture
of property such as a home, which had merely played a part in
the commission of a crime, cannot be deemed anything other than
punishment for the crime. 60 He raised the intriguing point that if
the year were 1931 and Congress had passed a statute that
authorized the forfeiture of every home in which alcoholic
beverages were consumed, would the Court adhere to its
position. 6 1 Well, the point didn't count for much with the
majority or, for that matter, with any other member of the Court.
What of the future? Bennis and Ursery demonstrate that
previous assumptions that the Court had embarked on a road to
limit the government's use of civil forfeiture were misplaced.
How the Court's altered course will play out remains to be seen.
The Court has yet to give us a clear test for determining when a
forfeiture is excessive under the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment. If you recall, the Court in Austin remanded
the case to the lower courts for their determination. Concurring
in Austin, Justice Scalia had argued that the property's
relationship to the crime, and not its value, is the only factor that
should be considered on the issue of excessiveness. 62 However,
the Austin majority (Blackmun, White, O'Connor, Stevens, and
Souter) stated that it was not ruling out the possibility that
"instrumentality" is a relevant factor but that the Court of
Appeals is not precluded from considering other factors in
determining whether the forfeiture of Austin's property was
excessive. 63 Since Austin was decided, lower courts have

59. Id. at 2144.

60. Id. at 2161 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
61. Id. at 2163.
62. Austin, 509 U.S. at 627-28 (Scalia, J., concurring).

63. Id. at 622.
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disagreed as to
excessiveness. 64

the

appropriate

test

for

determining

The Audience:
One comment about the forfeiture case. Whatever Justice
Ginsburg may say about it,
I do not think it was feminism,
because the woman involved had just succeeded in getting herself
off of welfare by using that car to establish a paper route. So she
may be focusing on the criminal activities of her husband, but it
still does not account for how she completely overlooks the
innocent owner in the case.
ProfessorHellerstein:
Well, I agree. I knew I would get into some trouble with
feminism. But I agree with your point. And in fact Justice
Thomas expressed a little concern about that aspect in his
concurring opinion. 65 Justice Ginsburg seemed hard-nosed about
it. I do not want to get into more detail. I'm just a country
lawyer. To get more deeply into that stuff is very, very risky.
II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
This was yet another term of "Fourth Amendment Lite." 66 The
Court decided three search and seizure cases, only one of which
64. See, e.g., United States v. One Parcel located at 427 and 429 Hall
Street, 74 F.3d 1165 (1lth Cir. 1996) (discussing circuit split). Congress is
also considering H.R. 1916, entitled "The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act,"
which is sponsored by Representative Henry J. Hyde of Illinois and Chairman
of the House Judiciary Committee. Hearings on the bill were held in July.
1996 which, if passed, would eliminate the cost bond required of civil
forfeiture claimants, provide appointed counsel for indigent claimants and
make substantial changes to the "innocent owner defense."
65. Bennis, 116 S.Ct. at 1002.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons. houses.
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is particularly noteworthy. In Whren v. United States, the Court
resolved the question of how courts should determine the
reasonableness of traffic stops when the claim is that the police
have used such a stop as a pretext in order to pursue their
suspicions concerning more serious crimes. In short, the Court
held that a purely objective test governs. 67 Thus, police officers
who lack grounds for stopping a person they suspect of criminal
activity may use the individual's commission of a traffic offense
as a basis for making a stop, during which they may investigate
68
their suspicions further.
Factually, Whren is a classic case of the type of police conduct
that has concerned those sensitive to Fourth Amendment values:
the use by the police of minimal violations of traffic offenses as a
pretext to stop and search vehicles. Plainclothes vice-squad
officers in an unmarked car observed two young black men riding
in a truck in "a high drug area" of Washington, D.C. 69 They
became suspicious when they saw the driver looking into the lap
of his passenger while pausing for what seemed to them an
unusually long time at a stop sign. 70 When the officers made a
U-turn to follow the truck, the driver made a turn without
signaling and sped away. 7 1 The officers followed the truck and
overtook it when it had stopped for a traffic light. 7 2 One of the
officers approached the driver's door, identified himself, and told
the driver to put the truck in park. 73 At the driver's window, the
officer saw two large plastic bags of what appeared to be crack
74
cocaine in Whren's hands.
Charged with various drug offenses. Whren and the driver
moved to suppress the drugs on the ground that the traffic stop
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated ...... Id.
67. Id. at 1772-74.
68. Id. at 1772.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and the officer's asserted ground for approaching their truck - to
warn the driver concerning traffic violations -- was pretextual. 7 5
The D.C. Circuit, affirming their convictions, held that whatever
the subjective beliefs of the particular officer, a traffic stop is
constitutional if a reasonable officer in the same circumstances
76
could have stopped the car for the suspected traffic violation.
In the Supreme Court, the defendants argued that, in the unique
context of civil traffic regulations, probable cause is not enough,
that use of vehicles is so heavily and technically regulated that it
creates both the opportunity and temptation for police to use
traffic stops as a means of investigating other crimes for which
they lack grounds, or as a means of enforcing traffic laws on the
basis of race. 77 They urged the Court to adopt a rule that would
hold unreasonable traffic stops even though supported by the
requisite level of suspicion if a reasonable police officer would
not have made the stop absent an improper purpose. 78 Writing
for the Court, Justice Scalia held that the temporary detention of
a motorist as to whom there is probable cause to believe that he
has violated the traffic laws does not violate the Fourth
Amendment, even if a reasonable officer would not have stopped
79
the motorist absent some additional law enforcement objective.
He distinguished the inventory search 80 and administrative
inspection cases, 8 1 in which the Court had indicated that
pretextual use of those procedures would be improper, on the
ground that they did not involve situations in which there is

75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773.
Id.

79. Id. at 1772-77.
80. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) ("An inventory search must
not be used as a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover
incriminating evidence."); Colorado v. Bertine. 479 U.S. 367. 372 (1987)
("No showing that the police, who were following standard procedures, acted
in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation.").
81. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716-17, n.27 (1987) (the search
violation
did not appear to be "a 'pretext' for obtaining evidence of.
of... penal laws").
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probable cause. 82 Where probable cause is present, he said, prior
decisions foreclose the argument that ulterior motives can
invalidate police conduct based upon it. 83 Justice Scalia also
rejected the argument that because perfect compliance with traffic
laws is virtually impossible, an objective test affords police carte
blanche to stop whomever they wish. He noted that the Court was
unable to identify a principle that would allow it to decide "at
what point a code of law becomes so expansive and so commonly
violated that the infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary
measure of the lawfulness of enforcement." 84 Even if such a
principle were clear, he observed, the Court would not know by
what standard it could decide which particular provisions of the
law are sufficiently important to merit enforcement. 85 To the
extent that it is alleged that the police are selectively enforcing
traffic laws because of racial bias, he stated that those claims are
properly dealt with under the Equal Protection Clause, not the
86
Fourth Amendment.
Given the Court's current composition, Whren is not a surprise.
More noteworthy is the Court's unanimity. The facts of the case
may be simple, but the problems that lie beneath the surface of
police enforcement of traffic laws are not, especially when those
laws are "enforced" against African-Americans and other
minorities. The petitioners' brief in Whren presented compelling
data about the centrality of race in police determinations to stop
people for minor traffic offenses, in the hope (expectation?) of
finding evidence of drug offenses. And consider how easy it is.
In one case, a Texas state trooper stopped a van with four black
occupants after his car had passed the van, doused its lights and
pulled onto the shoulder. When the van passed, the driver
changed lanes to allow some distance between the van and the
82. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773.
83. Id. at 1774, citing United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S.
579, 584, n.3 (1983); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973),
Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973); Scott v. United States, 436
U.S. 128, 138 (1978).
84. Id. at 1777.
85. Id.
86. Id.at 1774.
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police car on the shoulder. The van was then stopped for an
illegal lane change. Even though the court noted the trooper's
"remarkable record" of turning traffic stops into drug arrests on
250 prior occasions, it upheld the stop. 87 In another case, a Utah
deputy saw a car being driven by an African-American man
straddle the center line for one second before moving to the other
lane. This stop was upheld on the ground that the officer had
sufficient suspicion that the driver was impaired. 8 8 Thus, there is
a substantial empirical basis for the assertion that, in our
democratic republic, there exists, independent of positive law, a
89
crime known as "D.W.B." -- Driving While Black.

In contrast to Justice Scalia's Whren opinion, Chief Judge
Seymour of the Tenth Circuit, dissenting in a pre-Whren case, 90
pointed out that in Terry v. Ohio,9 1 the Supreme Court was quite
aware that harassment of minority groups by certain police
officers does occur, and that the objective standard adopted in
Teny was equally called for in the traffic infraction context. 92 "It
is difficult," he said, "to justify a stop as reasonable, even if
supported by an observed violation, if the undisputed facts
93
indicate that the violation does not ordinarily result in a stop."
Justice Scalia's assertion that claims premised on the selective
enforcement of traffic laws based on race are properly the subject
of the Equal Protection Clause strikes me as disingenuous,
87. United States v. Roberson, 6 F.3d 1088 (5th Cir. 1993) cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1204 (1994). Although the divided court concluded that the state
trooper had a "legitimate basis for stopping the van," Id. at 1092. the court
indicated its dissatisfaction with "what appears to be a common practice of
some law enforcement officers to use technical violations as a cover for
exploring more serious violations .... " Id.
88. United States v. Lee, 73 F.3d 1034 (10th Cir. 1996). See also United
States v. Harvey, 16 F.3d 109 (6th Cir. 1994); Washington v. Vogel. 880 F.
Supp. 1534 (M.D.Fla. 1995); Lowery v. Commonwealth, 388 S.E.2d 265

(Va. 1990).
89. Henry Louis Gates, Jr. Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man, THE

NEw YORKER, Oct. 1995 at 59.
90. United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995) cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 2529 (1996).
91. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

92. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 790.
93. Id.
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especially when it is made during the same term in which the
Court rejected a discovery demand by the defendant based on his
claim of selective prosecution because of race 94 -- a case that I
will discuss later.
95
The second search and seizure case, Ornelas v. United States,
is not as much a Fourth Amendment case as it is one that is
determinative of the appropriate standard of appellate review that
governs the issues of reasonable suspicion to stop and probable
cause to search. Ornelas was an eight to one ruling with Chief
Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority and holding that an
96
appellate court must review those questions de novo.
Milwaukee detectives who were conducting narcotics surveillance
97
became suspicious of a car they spotted in a motel parking lot.
Checks of the motel's guest list and vehicle registration records
revealed two names, both of which turned up on a data base of
narcotics traffickers. 9 8 When the defendants left the motel and
went to the car, the detectives confronted them and asked
whether they had any illegal drugs or contraband. 99 The
defendants said no and acquiesced when the detectives asked for
permission to search the car. 100 One of the detectives suspected
that there was contraband behind a loose door panel, partly, he
later testified, because a nearby screw was rusty. 10 1 The
detective dismantled the panel and found cocaine hidden behind
it. 102 The trial court found that there was reasonable suspicion to
stop the defendants and that the detectives' suspicion ripened into
probable cause once the loose panel was discovered. The Seventh
Circuit reviewed deferentially the district court's determinations
of reasonable suspicion and probable cause, stating that it would

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996).
Id. at 1662.
Id. at 1659.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1660.
Id.
Id.
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reverse only upon a finding of clear error. 103 The court found no
clear error in the reasonable suspicion determination but
remanded the case as to the probable cause finding for a
determination whether the detective was credible when he
testified about the loose panel. 10 4 A magistrate judge found the
testimony credible and the district court accepted that finding. On
appeal once again, the Seventh Circuit held that determination not
clearly erroneous. 10 5 Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the court
of appeals erred when it applied a deferential standard of review
and he explained that the process for determining whether
reasonable suspicion and probable cause exist requires two steps:
determining the events leading up to the stop and search (the
historical facts), and deciding whether those facts, viewed from
the standpoint of a reasonable police officer, amounted to
reasonable suspicion or probable cause (a mixed question of law
and fact). 10 6 He pointed out that anything less than de novo
review of these issues would permit Fourth Amendment questions
to turn on whether different trial judges draw general conclusions
that the facts are sufficient or insufficient to constitute probable
cause; such varied results would be inconsistent with a unitary
system of law. 107 He noted further that independent review is
necessary if appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to
clarify the legal principles of, reasonable suspicion and probable

cause. 108
Justice Scalia, the lone dissenter, argued that a deferential
standard of review is the only practicable approach in search and
seizure cases. 10 9 Even though he acknowledged that the
determination of probable cause or reasonable suspicion involves
a mixed question of fact and law, he insisted that merely labeling
them mixed questions does not establish that they should receive
103. United States v. Omelas, 16 F.3d 714, 719 (7th Cir. 1994).
104. Id. at 721-22.
105. United States v. Omelas, 52 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 1995) cert. granted.
116 S. Ct. 417 (1995).
106. Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1661-62.
107. Id. at 1662.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1664-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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de novo review. 110 He contended that a more deferential standard
of review is necessary because the district court has more
expertise and also because the fact bound nature of many search
that individual appellate decisions lack
and seizure cases means
11 1
"
value.
"law-clarifying
That the Court had to resolve a split in the circuits on this issue
is the most noteworthy aspect of this case. Although Justice
Scalia is correct that probable cause and reasonable suspicion
issues are heavily fact-driven, it does not follow that de novo
review is unimportant. First, as the Chief Justice pointed out, the
Court had never deferred on these issues to trial court
determinations. 112 Second, the framework for appellate
discussion of probable cause and reasonable suspicion is set
frequently by fact patterns discerned from prior rulings. Third,
and perhaps most important, trial judges, especially in high
profile cases or those involving very serious felonies, are
frequently reluctant to suppress crucial evidence and interdict a
prosecution. Therefore, many judges tend to construe reasonable
suspicion and probable cause quite broadly. Consequently,
deferential review exacerbates the risk that Fourth Amendment
principles will be diluted. On the other hand, de novo review
insures that such determinations are made by a court that is
institutionally removed from pressures that exist at the trial
level. 113
The Court's only other Fourth Amendment case last term was
decided per curiam. In Pennsylvania v. Labron, 1 14 the Court
reversed two rulings by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that it
read as interpreting the Fourth Amendment to require the police
110. Id. at 1664.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1662.
113. In Thompson v. Keohane, 116 S. Ct. 457 (1996), the Court reached a
result similar to that in Ornelas about a state court's determination of whether
a suspect was "in custody" during questioning and was therefore entitled to be
warned of his Miranda rights. Justice Ginsburg, writing for a seven-member
majority, concluded that the "in custody" determination is a mixed question of
law and fact that must be independently reviewed by a federal court on habeas
corpus review of a state court judgment. Id. at 466-67.
114. 116 S. Ct. 2485 (1996).
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to obtain a warrant for a vehicle search if they have time to do
so. The majority pointed out that the rulings were inconsistent
with California v. Carney, 115 and reiterated the rule that "if a car
is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains
contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search
the vehicle without more." 116 Justice Stevens, joined in dissent
by Justice Ginsburg, did not dispute the merits of the majority's
Fourth Amendment position but maintained that the Pennsylvania
had rested its decisions on the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court
1 17
Constitution.
III. DUE PROCESS/FAIR TRIAL
Two Due Process/Fair Trial cases were decided this past
term. 118 In Cooper v. Oklahoma,1 19 a unanimous Court struck
down an Oklahoma statute that required a criminal defendant to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is
incompetent to stand trial. 120 Four years ago, in Medina v.
California,12 1 the Court held that it was not a denial of due
process to place upon the defendant the burden of proving
incompetency by a preponderance of evidence. Justice Stevens,
who dissented in Medina, authored the opinion in Cooper and he
rejected Oklahoma's argument that a clear and convincing
standard is a reasonable accommodation of the opposing interests
of the State and the defendant. 122 He pointed out that even
115. 471 U.S. 396 (1985).
116. Labron, 116 S. Ct. at 2487.
117. Id. at 2487-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996): Montana v.
Egelhoff, 116 S.Ct. 2013 (1996).
119. 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996).
120. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, S. 1175.4 (B) (1991) provides in relevant part.
that: "The court, at the hearing on the application [for determination of

competency], shall determine, by clear and convincing evidence, if the person
is incompetent. The person shall be presumed to be competent for the purposes
of the allocation of the burden of proof and burden of going forward with the
evidence." Id.
121. 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
122. Cooper, 116 S.Ct. at 1377.
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though Medina allows a State to require the defendant to carry
the burden of proving incompetence, requiring that he do so by
clear and convincing evidence rather than by a preponderance of
the evidence is a very different question because it is nothing less
than whether a state "may proceed with a criminal trial after the
defendant has demonstrated that he is more likely than not
incompetent. ,123 In resolving the issue, Justice Stevens looked
first to historical experience and then to current state practices.
He observed that although the English common law cases
accepted the fundamental proposition that an incompetent accused
could not be put to trial, they furnished no guidance as to
competency standards. 124 Nonetheless, he noted, that by framing
the issue for the jury as to whether the defendant was "more
likely than not" incompetent, the case law suggested a standard
no more demanding than a preponderance of the evidence. 125 He
pointed out also that later cases using a preponderance standard
did not suggest that they were making any departure from preConstitution case law. 126 In other words there is significance, as
Sherlock Holmes would have it, in that the dog did not bark.
Justice Stevens also relied on the fact that the vast majority of
states had not adopted a clear and convincing standard, and noted
that Oklahoma was one of only four states that had. 127
The essence of Justice Stevens's opinion was his conclusion
that imposition of a clear and convincing burden of proof creates
a significant risk of an erroneous determination that the defendant
is competent, and this contravened the fundamental principle that
an incompetent defendant's right not to be forced to trial must be
jealously guarded. 128 He noted that in Medina the Court, in
holding that placing the burden of proof on the defendant to
establish his incompetency did not violate due process, observed
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id. at 1378.
Id.
Id. at 1378-80.
Id. at 1380. See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-56d (b)(1995); 50 PA.

CONS. STAT. § 7403(a) (Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 40.1-5.3-3 (Supp.
1995).
128. Cooper, 116 S.Ct. at 1381.
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that its ruling would affect the outcome of competency
determinations only in a narrow class of cases where the evidence
is in equipoise, -- where the evidence that the defendant is
competent is just as strong as the evidence that he is
incompetent.129 He pointed out, however, that under the
Oklahoma statute, a clear and convincing standard affects a class
of cases in which the defendant has already demonstrated that he
is more likely than not incompetent. 130 In that type of case,
Justice Stevens reasoned, the defendant's fundamental right to be
tried only while competent outweighs the State's efficiency
interests. He emphasized that because a defendant's other rights
and his ability to communicate effectively with counsel are
dependent on his competency, an erroneous determination of
competence threatens the basic fairness of the trial itself. 13 1 The
weakness in the State's argument can best be seen by its attempt
to benefit from Addington v. Texas, 132 in which the Court held
that in order to commit a person involuntarily to a civil mental
hospital the State must establish by clear and convincing evidence
that the person is in need of confinement. The State argued that
Addington supported imposition of the same standard for
determining incompetency. Justice Stevens responded by pointing
out the crucial difference between the two situations:
The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown
by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual's
fundamental interest in liberty. The prohibition against requiring
the criminal defendant to demonstrate incompetence by clear and
convincing evidence safeguards the fundamental right not to
stand trial while incompetent. 133
The Court's unanimity in Cooper suggests that there is little to
discuss. That only four States had placed the burden on the
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id. at 1381-83.
Id. at 1381-84.
441 U.S. 418 (1979).
Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1384.
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defendant to establish incompetence by a clear and convincing
standard signals that they were well out of the mainstream. In
fact, Justice Stevens suggested that Oklahoma and Connecticut
may have been prompted to enact this requirement as the result of
Addington. If that is the case, they seriously misread Addington.
In Montana v. Egelhoff, 134 by a five to four vote, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of a Montana statute that precludes a
jury from considering voluntary intoxication on the issue of a
defendant's intent to commit the crime, even when intent is a
necessary element of the crime.135 The justices were in
substantial disagreement as to how to even characterize the statute
and Justice Ginsburg's vote was decisive since she concurred in
the judgment, but not in Justice Scalia's plurality opinion. Justice
O'Connor dissented and was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter,
and Breyer, Justice Ginsburg's more usual companions.
The Montana Supreme Court found the statute violative of due
process because it deprived the defendant of his right to present
all relevant evidence to rebut the State's proof of each element of
the offense, and because it also shifted impermissibly to the
defendant the burden of proof on an element of the crime of
deliberate homicide. 136 Justice Scalia's plurality opinion, joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Thomas,
held that a defendant's right to have a jury consider voluntary
intoxication evidence in determining whether he possesses the
requisite mental state is not a fundamental principle of justice. 137
He conceded that over the last century most jurisdictions have
134. 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996).
135. MONT. CODE ANN., § 45-2-203

(1995) provides:
"A person who is in an intoxicated condition is criminally responsible

for his conduct and an intoxicated condition is not a defense to any
offense and may not be taken into consideration in determining the
existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense unless the
defendant proves that he did not know that it was an intoxicating
substance when he consumed, smoked, sniffed, injected, or otherwise
ingested the substance causing the condition."

Id.
136. State v. Eglehoff, 900 P.2d 260 (Mont.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct.

593 (1995).
137. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2021.
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come to allow voluntary intoxication as a defense on the issue of
specific intent. 138 He concluded, however, that such acceptance
is too recent and has not received sufficiently uniform and
permanent allegiance to qualify as fundamental. 139 He also
pointed out that Montana's nonacceptance implements a moral
perception that one who has voluntarily impaired his own
faculties should be responsible for the consequences. 140 He
distinguished both Chambers v. Mississippi14 1 and Crane v.
Kentucky, 142 upon which Egelhoff relied. Chambers, he said,
does not stand for a broad rule that the exclusion of relevant
exculpatory evidence violates a defendant's right to present a
defense, and Crane does not stand for the proposition that making
the prosecution's burden lighter violates due process. 143 Any
evidentiary rule, he observed, can have that effect and the Court
has often held that states may facilitate the prosecutor's task
change itself violates a fundamental principle of
unless the
14 4
justice.
Unlike the plurality, Justice Ginsburg viewed the statute as
much more than merely an evidentiary proscription. She believed
it was a conscious choice by the Montana Legislature to redefine
the meaning of "purposefully" and "knowingly;" this made
evidence of voluntary intoxication logically irrelevant to proof of
the defendant's requisite mental state. 145 However, she saw
nothing unconstitutional about this because, given the common
law tradition of nonrecognition of voluntary intoxication as a
defense and adherence by a significant minority of states to that
tradition, it did not offend a fundamental principle of justice. 146
138. Id. at 2018-19.
139. Id. at 2021.
140. Id. at 2020.
141. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
142. 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
143. Id. at 2021-22.
144. Id. at 2222.
145. Id. at 224. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 2025. In a separate dissent, Justice Souter argued that the statute
could be upheld if interpreted as Justice Ginsburg read it, but that the Montana
Supreme Court's interpretation precluded such a reading and that the state,
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Dissenting, Justice O'Connor brought still a different
perspective to the Montana statute; she believed that the only
reason it was enacted was to improve the prosecution's chances
of obtaining a conviction. 14 7 She argued that this could not be
achieved without violation of the Due Process Clause because the
statute effectively deprived the defendant of his due process right
48
to present a defense. 1
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens, also dissented and
stated that even read Justice Ginsburg's way, as a statute that
redefined the requisite mental state, the statute's constitutionality
was open to doubt. 149 However, he rejected Justice Ginsburg's
interpretation and suggested that if the Montana Legislature had
wanted to equate voluntary intoxication, knowledge and purpose,
it would have written a statute that plainly said so. 15 0 Moreover,
he argued, to read the statute Justice Ginsburg's way rendered
voluntary intoxication the legal equivalent of purpose and
knowledge but only where external circumstances would establish
purpose or knowledge. 15 1 He pointed out that this produced
anomalous results:
[a]n intoxicated driver stopped at an intersection who
unknowingly accelerated into a pedestrian would likely be found
guilty, for a jury unaware of intoxication would likely infer
knowledge or purpose. An identically intoxicated driver racing
along a highway who unknowingly sideswiped another car would
likely be found innocent, for a jury unaware of intoxication
would likely infer negligence. 152
In light of Justice Ginsburg's controlling vote, this case turned
on how the Montana statute was characterized. Had Justice
Ginsburg considered it evidence-precluding as to an element of a
crime rather than a redefinition of the crime itself, the statute
therefore, had failed to demonstrate why, as an evidence-preclusion rule, the
statute was justified. Id. at 2033 (Souter J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 2031 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 2030.
149. Id. at 2035 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
150. Id.

151. Id. at 2035.
152. Id.
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likely would not have been sustained. For some reason, she chose
not to accept the interpretation placed upon the statute by the
Montana Supreme Court. As Justice Souter pointed out, not
accepting the interpretation given a state statute by the State's
153
highest court is a significant departure from normal practice.
Justice Ginsburg's choice to depart is a puzzlement and it turned
the case.
IV. SIXTH AMENDMENT/RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
In Lewis v. United States, 15 4 the defendant was charged with
two misdemeanor counts of obstructing the mails. Each count
carried a maximum sentence of six months and therefore each,
standing alone, was a "petty offense" to which the right to trial
by jury did not attach. 15 5 However, the defendant could have
been subject to consecutive sentences if convicted of both counts.
The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a jury trial and
also stated that it would not impose a sentence of more than six
months, even if the defendant were convicted of both counts. The
Court granted certiorari to resolve a difference among the circuits
on the issue of whether petty offenses, when aggregated in a
single prosecution, require a jury trial. 156
In a five to four decision, written by Justice O'Connor, the
Court held that the scope of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right
does not change just because a defendant faces multiple
charges. 15 7 She noted that the maximum penalty has long been
the criterion for determining whether an offense was "petty," that
it signified a legislature's judgment about the severity of the
crime, and that a prosecutor's and judge's decision to try multiple
counts together has no effect on this legislative determination. 158
153. Id. at 2033 (Souter, J., dissenting), citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 381 (1992); Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875).
154. 116 S. Ct. 2162 (1996).
155. Id. See Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989); Baldwin
v- New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
156. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2166.
157. Id. at 2165.
158. Id. at 2166-67.
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She pointed out that a judge's decision that the jury trial right
applies when counts are joined would amount to a substitution of
the judge's assessment for that of the legislature. 159 Also, she
emphasized that the offenses with which Lewis was charged were
presumptively petty and that where the legislature has determined
that an offense is petty, the Court does not look to the potential
prison term faced by a particular defendant who is charged with
more than one such petty offense. 160 She distinguished Codispoti
v. Pennsylvania,16 1 in which the defendant faced multiple
charges of criminal contempt, on the ground that the legislature
had set no specific penalty, so the Court had to look at the
punishment actually imposed. 162
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred in the
judgment but only because the magistrate judge said at the outset
that she would not sentence the defendant to more than six
months. 163 He called the majority opinion "one of the most
serious incursions on the right to jury trial in the Court's
history,"' 164 and expressed the view that Codispoti and Taylor v.
Hayes165 established that the right to jury trial extends to a
defendant who is sentenced in one proceeding to more than six
66
months imprisonment. 1
The major hurdle that confronted Lewis was the paucity of
authoritative source material for the proposition that aggregation
of petty offenses triggers the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial. He also argued that since the Sixth Amendment states that
in "all criminal prosecutions," there is a right to jury trial, the
159. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2166.
160. Id. at 2168.

161. 418 U.S. 506 (1974).
162. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2167-68.
163. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2172 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 2169.

165. 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
166. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2170-71. Justice Stevens. joined by Justice
Ginsburg, agreed with Justice Kennedy's Sixth Amendment analysis but parted
company with him as to the effect of the magistrate judge's representation that
she would not sentence Lewis to more than six months if he were convicted.
Id. He maintained that the right to a jury trial cannot be defeated by a judge's
promise of a short sentence. Id. at 2173-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Framers must have intended the jury trial right to exist in cases of
aggregated petty offenses. But the Court did not even address that
argument and it is easy. to understand why--it simply proves too
much because such a literal reading would also encompass any
prosecution including a petty offense that is not punishable by
more than six months. Lewis's interpretivist Sixth Amendment
argument thus impaled itself on the Court's venerable
jurisprudence holding that there is no right to a jury for a petty
167
offense.
Justice Kennedy's vehement denunciation of the Court's
decision was driven substantially by his concerns about
prosecutorial abuse insofar as a prosecutor, seeking to circumvent
a defendant's jury trial right, could decide to carve up charges
16 8
into segments punishable by no more than six months apiece.
If Justice Kennedy's fear is real, rather than theoretical, then the
Lewis decision is a matter for legitimate concern. However, the
Court did not appear to share Justice Kennedy's trepidations and I
have not observed or heard from others that prosecutors have
proceeded in such a fashion.
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION/SELECTIVE
ENFORCEMENT
Defendants who challenge prosecutorial charging decisions on
equal protection grounds have generally faced an uphill struggle.
Although courts have shown greater sensitivity where First
implicated, 169 those claiming
rights are
Amendment
discriminatory enforcement have not met with much success. In
United States v. Armstrong, 170 the Court did not ease the way for
such challenges in the future. The defendants in Armstrong were
charged with conspiracies to possess and distribute more than
167. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Nev York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
168. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2171 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

169. See, e.g., United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (en
banc) (Government in a failure to register for the draft prosecution should be
required to explain the reasons for moving against the defendant, a leader in
the anti-Vietnam War movement).
170. 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
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fifty grams of crack cocaine.171 They claimed that the Los
Angeles United States Attorney's office decided to prosecute
them because they were black and they moved to dismiss the
indictment or, alternatively, for discovery of information
possessed by the government that they believed would
substantiate their claim. 172 They submitted an affidavit by a
"Paralegal Specialist" employed by the Office of the Federal
Public Defender that alleged that in all twenty-four drug
prosecutions closed by that office in 1991 that were brought
under the same statutes under which the defendants were
prosecuted, the defendant was black.173 The government denied
that race played any part in the decision to prosecute and it
submitted a Drug Enforcement Administration Report that stated
that the manufacture and distribution of crack are controlled by
Jamaicans, Haitians, and Black street gangs.174 The defendants
countered with affidavits from various criminal justice and drug
treatment personages that asserted that although whites as well as
blacks use crack, only blacks are prosecuted for crack offenses in
Los Angeles. 175 The district court granted the discovery motion
and when the government refused to comply, it dismissed the
indictment. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, 176 but
an en banc panel affirmed the district court's order of
dismissal. 177
With Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority, the
Supreme Court reversed. He held that the government's
obligation under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure 178 to turn over to the defendant materials which it
171. Id. at 1483.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1484
175. Id.
176. United States v. Armstrong, 21 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1994).
177. United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1995) cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 377 (1995).
178. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (a)(1)(c). This rule provides in pertinent part:
Upon request of the defendant the government shall permit the
defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents,

photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions
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possesses and are material to the preparation of the defendant's
defense does not include all claims that might constitute a
"sword" attacking the charges against a defendant; the phrase
"defendant's defense" refers only to a defendant's response, or
"shield" to the prosecution's case-in-chief.179 To interpret Rule
16 otherwise, he stated, would disrupt the symmetry in the rule
and create an anomaly because the government's work product in

other prosecutions would be open to defense inspection, while the
government's work-product in the defendants' own case would,
18 1
because of Rule 16 (a)(2), 180 remain off limits.
Although the Court held that Rule 16 is unavailable for a
selective enforcement discovery quest, it specified that discovery
was available if the defendant could make a significant
showing. 182 The Chief Justice emphasized that a selective
thereof, which are within the possession, custody or control of
government, and which are material to the preparation of
defendant's defense or are intended for use by the government
evidence in chief at the trial, or were obtained from or belong to
defendant.

the
the
as
the

Id.
179. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1485. When it comes to matters that would
benefit a defendant, the Chief Justice has an apparent affection for the
.sword"-"shield" metaphor in defeating a defendant's claim. Id. at 1485. See.
e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (holding that an indigent defendant
is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in pursuing a discretionary appeal or
petition for certiorari.) In disposing of the defendant's due process claim there,
the Chief Justice emphasized that "[ilt is ordinarily the defendant, rather than
the State, who initiates the appellate process ... and that the "defendant needs
an attorney on appeal not as a shield ... but rather as a sword to upset the
prior determination of guilt." Id. at 610-11.
180. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (a)(1)(A)(2). This rule provides:
Information Not Subject to Disclosure. Except as provided in
paragraphs (A), (B), and D of subdivision (a)(l), this rule does not
authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other
internal government documents made by the attorney for the
government or other government agents in connection with the
investigation or prosecution of the case, or of statements made by
government witnesses except as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
Id.
181. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1485.
182. Id. at 1488.
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prosecution claim asks the court to tread upon the province of the
executive by calling into question the presumption that a
prosecutor has not violated equal protection principles. 183 To
rebut that presumption, a defendant must demonstrate that the
prosecutorial policy had a discriminatory effect, that it was
motivated by a discriminatory purpose, and that similarly situated
individuals of a different race were not prosecuted. 184 On one
hand, he underscored the need for requiring a similarly rigorous
standard for discovery in aid of a selective prosecution claim -that of a credible showing of different treatment, while on the
other hand, he did not think a defendant should find the showing
too difficult to make. 185 Nonetheless, he held that the defendants
did not make that showing. He suggested that they could have
investigated whether similarly situated persons of other races
were prosecuted by the State of California, and were known to
federal law enforcement officers but were not prosecuted in
federal court. 186 The problem with the defendants' submission,
he stated, was that it failed to identify individuals who were not
black, who could have been prosecuted for the offenses for which
87
they were charged, but were not. 1
Justice Stevens was the only dissenter. 188 Although he agreed
with the Court that Rule 16 is inapplicable to selective
prosecution claims, he argued that the district court possessed
inherent authority to order discovery and that the order in this
case was proper when considered in light of the need for judicial
183. Id. at 1486.
184. Id. at 1487-88.
185. Id. at 1489.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1492 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Souter concurred but
stated that he joined the Court's discussion of Rule 16 only as to the facts of

this case. Id. at 1489 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg also concurred
but emphasized that the majority's holding regarding Rule 16 applies only to
selective prosecution claims. Id. (Ginsburg J., concurring). Justice Breyer
concurred in part and in the judgment but believed that the Court had taken too
narrow a view of Rule 16, and stated that the rule "does not limit a defendant's
discovery rights to documents related to the Government's case-in-chief." Id.
at 1489-90 (Breyer, J., concurring).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss2/5

30

Hellerstein: Criminal Law Decisions

1997]

CRIMINAL LAW DECISIONS

425

vigilance over certain types of drug prosecutions. 18 9 In his view,
that need was underscored in this case by three factors: the
severity, under federal law, of sentences for crack cocaine as
compared to sentences for powder cocaine, the disparity between
state and federal sentences for crack offenses, and undisputed
statistics showing that the brunt of the elevated federal penalties
falls heavily on African-Americans. 190
Unquestionably, for those who believe strongly that federal law
enforcement with respect to cocaine offenses is discriminatory
against minorities, especially African-Americans, this decision is
a disappointment. However, that not even Justice Stevens could
offer a compelling argument for affirmance demonstrates more
the weakness of the litigation strategies below than the Court's
hostility to affording a defendant claiming racially selective
prosecution an adequate avenue to establish the claim.
Armstrong's moving papers were relatively thin, consisting of an
affidavit of a so-called Paralegal Specialist and a responsive
submission that whites as well as blacks use cocaine. In light of
such a meager showing, it is understandable that the Court was
reluctant to impose on the government the burden of producing
data about its prosecutorial practices.
V. HABEAS CORPUS
On April 24, 1996, the President signed into law the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
[hereinafter "Antiterrorism Act"] 19 1 which contains extremely
formidable obstacles for a state prisoner seeking to obtain habeas
corpus relief through a second or successive petition. Within
weeks the Court, with four justices dissenting, granted
certiorari 1 92 in Felker v. Turpin193 to consider the Act's
constitutionality and ordered the case to be heard in June.
189.
190.
191.
192.
Souter,
193.

Id. at 1492 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1492-93.
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1220 (1996).
See Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 1588 (1996). Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented.
116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996).
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Scholars and lawyers, as well as the four justices, felt that the
Court should not deal with the complex issues raised by the Act
in such precipitous fashion. Nonetheless, when the decision
upholding the act was rendered on June 28, 1996, the Court was
unanimous.
The Antiterrorism Act requires dismissal of a claim presented
by a state prisoner in a second or successive petition if the claim
was also presented in a prior petition, and also compels dismissal
of a claim that was not presented in a prior federal application
unless certain extremely rigorous conditions are met. 194 To
effectuate these strict standards, the Act creates a gatekeeping
mechanism whereby a petitioner must make a motion in the court
of appeals for leave to file a second or successive habeas
application in the district court, and a three-judge panel
determines whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing that the substantive requirements for successive
applications have been met. 195 The act further provides that a
panel's grant or denial of authorization to file a second or
successive petition is not appealable and may not be the subject of
196
a petition for a writ of certiorari.
Eugene Wayne Felker, who was sentenced to death, filed with
the Supreme Court a document entitled "Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, for Appellate or Certiorari Review of the
Decision of the United States Circuit Court for the Eleventh
194. Antiterrorism Act § 106(b)(2). The statute requires dismissal of any
claim raised in a prior application by the same petitioner and dismissal of a

claim raised for the first time in a second or successive petition unless:
(A) the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was
previously unavailable; or (B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim
could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due
diligence; and (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed

in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no
reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the
underlying offense.

Id.
195. Antiterrorism Act § 106 (b)(3)(A).
196. Antiterrorism Act § 106 (b)(3)(E).
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Circuit, and for Stay of Execution." 19 7 The court of appeals had
dismissed his second habeas petition for failure to meet the
standards of section 106(b)(2) of the Act. 198 The issues that
confronted the Supreme Court were the extent to which the act
applied to a petition for habeas corpus filed in the Supreme
Court, whether the application of the act suspended the writ of
habeas corpus in Felker's case itself, and whether its preclusion
of review by certiorari constitutes an unconstitutional restriction
on the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. 199
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that
although the Antiterrorism Act imposes new conditions on the
Court's authority to grant relief, it does not deprive the Court of
its jurisdiction to entertain original habeas corpus petitions. 200 He
explained that the act's preclusion of review, by appeal or
certiorari, of grants and denials of permission to file second or
successive petitions is similar to an 1868 act that was at issue in
Ex parte Yerger.20 1 As to that act, which repealed a previous
expansion of habeas and appellate jurisdiction, he noted that it
did not repeal the Court's power, conferred by the Judiciary Act
of 1789 and expanded by an 1867 Act, to grant habeas corpus as

197. Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2337.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254 (1994). 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)
provides:
Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any
justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their
respective jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge shall be entered in
the records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint
complained of is had.
Id.
Section 2254(a) provides:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court

shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the
ground that he is custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.
Id.
201. 75 U.S. 85 (1868).
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an original matter. 202 Similarly, he reasoned, the Antiterrorism
Act does not address the Court's power to hear original habeas
petitions and to find an implied repeal of that power would be no
more appropriate in this instance than it was in Ex Parte
Yerger.203 He concluded, therefore, since the Antiterrorism Act
does not disturb the Court's authority to grant an original habeas
petition. which is an exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the noreview provision does not violate Article III, Section 2 of the
4
Constitution. 20
The Chief Justice also held that the Antiterrorism Act did not
violate the suspension of habeas corpus provision of the
Constitution. 205 Although he acknowledged that the scope of
habeas corpus today is much broader than when the Constitution
was framed, he concluded that the Suspension Clause limits the
power of Congress to suspend the writ in its present form. Even
so. he noted, the Act does not amount to a suspension of the writ
because its gatekeeper provision merely transfers from the district
court to the court of appeals a screening function which would
20 6
previously have been performed by the district court.
The Felker decision mirrors the approach taken by the Court
during the Reconstruction Era and is reflected in cases such as
Yerger and Ex Parte McCardle.207 By construing a statute as a
reduction in the Court's appellate jurisdiction but not a total
cancellation of it, the Court again leaves for the enjoyment of the
202. Felker, 116 S. Ct at 2338-39.
203. Id.

204. Id. U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2 provides in pertinent part:
In all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls.
and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have

original jurisdiction. In all other Cases before mentioned, the supreme
Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with
such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall

make.
Id.
205. Id. at 2339-40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 provides: "The Privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." Id.
206. Felker, 116 S.Ct. at 2340.
207. 74 U.S. 506 (1868).
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scholars the unresolved (and unresolvable?) debate over the
extent of Congressional power to affect the Supreme Court's
20 8
appellate jurisdiction.
But what of the people on death row? Oh yes, Virginia, despite
the nasties in Congress, Christmas remains and the Supreme
Court still has original jurisdiction to entertain a habeas corpus
petition. But will Santa Claus ever come? That is quite a different
question. As the Chief Justice reminded us, even before the
Antiterrorism Act became law, the Court's own Rule 20.4
required a habeas petitioner to "show exceptional circumstances
warranting the exercise of the Court's discretionary powers and
show that adequate relief cannot be obtained in any other form or
from any other court," and that original writs are "rarely
granted. '"209 Enter the Antiterrorism Act, accompanied by the
Chief Justice's observation that the act imposes new requirements
for the granting of relief which themselves inform the Court's
authority to grant habeas relief. 2 10 In this setting, Felker's habeas
claims stood no chance of success and they received a terse burial
by the Chief Justice who concluded that they did not materially
differ from numerous other claims made by successive habeas
petitioners. 2 1 1 In the film, The Hustler, Paul Newman (Fast
Eddie) at the conclusion of his round of pool shots says to Jackie
Gleason (Minnesota Fats), "I didn't leave you much, Fats."
Gleason replies, "Fast Eddie, you left me just enough." I doubt
that Fats would say the same about the Court's jurisdiction to
entertain original writs for habeas corpus.
The next habeas case, Gray v. Netherland,2 12 is particularly
disturbing. Gray, a death row inmate, sought habeas relief
208. See Henry M. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction

of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364-65
(1953); Leonard Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960); Gerald Gunther.
Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction:An Opinionated
Guide to the Ongoing Debate. 36 STAN. L. REV. 895. 896-99 (1984).
209. Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2341.
210. Id. at 2339.
211. Id.
212. 116 S. Ct. 2074 (1996).
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alleging that he had been denied due process because he was not
given adequate notice of particular evidence the prosecution
intended to use against him at the penalty phase of his trial. In a
five to four decision the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, rejected Gray's due process claim because to credit it
would constitute a new constitutional rule and that it would,
therefore, contravene the "new constitutional rule" principle of
2 13
Teague v. Lane.
At the outset of Gray's capital murder trial, the prosecution
informed him that at the penalty phase, it would introduce
statements he made to a co-defendant admitting to specified
uncharged murders that due to their notoriety were known as "the
Sorrells murders." 2 14 However, at the penalty hearing, the
prosecution introduced not only Gray's statements about the
Sorrells murders but also photographs and police testimony which
implicated him in them. 215 The Chief Justice acknowledged that
Gray had not been notified of the additional evidence until one
day before it was presented. 2 16 However, he noted that rather
than seek a continuance, Gray's attorney chose to move to
exclude the evidence for lack of notice. 2 17 Therefore, for Gray to
prevail on these facts, Gray had to establish that due process
requires that he receive more than a day's notice, that it required
a continuance whether or not he sought one, or that, if he chose
not to seek a continuance, exclusion was the only appropriate
remedy for the inadequate notice. 2 18 Even if Gray could sustain
this burden, he must still lose, the Chief Justice held, because
adoption of a rule that a capital defendant must be afforded a
meaningful opportunity to explain or deny the evidence
introduced against him at sentencing would be a new rule and
2 19
therefore inconsistent with Teague.

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 2084. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
Gray, 116 S. Ct. at 2078-79.
Id. at 2078.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2083.
Id.
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Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and
Breyer, dissented asserting that there is nothing new in a rule that
capital defendants must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to
defend against the State's penalty phase evidence. 220 She argued
that the rule was clearly violated by the fact that the prosecution
had given the defense assurances that prevented the defense from
conducting the investigation required to counter the testimony
presented by the prosecution. 22 1 She also criticized the majority's
emphasis on the absence of a formal request by defense counsel
for a continuance, stating her belief that the district court's
statement that counsel had pleaded for additional time to prepare,
222
was more than adequate to protect Gray's lack of notice claim.
The existence of a fair trial right, she stated, "should not turn on
whether counsel next says, "'please exclude this evidence, as
opposed to please give me more time.',223
In my view, the majority cut it much too thinly. With life or
death in the balance, the majority's characterization of Gray's
claim as calling for a new constitutional principle is
disingenuous. If the issue is addressed in straight, common sense
language, the only question is whether a prosecutor should be
permitted to represent one thing to the defense and to then
sandbag the defendant by drastically departing from that
representation. As Justice Ginsburg perceptively pointed out, the
majority applied a divide and conquer approach to Gray's claim.
First, as to Gray's claim that the state had misled him, the
majority concluded that the claim may not have been raised or
addressed in the lower courts. With the "misleading" claim
dispatched, the majority then recast the issue as a "notice-ofevidence" claim for which there was no established constitutional
principle and rendered it prey to the Teague doctrine. 224 The
question can be asked whether given what was at stake, the
Virginia prosecutors should be allowed to pull such a stunt. Or, if
you don't like that formulation (because the issue of whether they
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 2090 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2091.
Id. at 2092 n.11.
Id.
Id.at 2090-91.
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"misled" Gray may not be entirely moribund) 225 whether defense
counsel's failure to request clearly that he needed a continuance
should be sufficient to offset what the prosecutors did. Some
might say that only lawyers can arrange such constructs.
The last case, which I shall discuss only briefly, has been
rendered academic by subsequent legislation. In Lonchar v.
Thomas, 226 the issue was whether a federal court may dismiss a
first federal habeas petition for general "equitable" reasons apart
from those set forth in the relevant statutes, Federal Habeas
Corpus Rules, and precedents. In an opinion by Justice Breyer,
the Court said "no" because at this stage in our history, habeas
corpus is governed heavily by statute. 22 7 Lonchar was sentenced
to death in 1987 and for the next seven years. he not only did not
seek to block his execution, he opposed all efforts by others to do
so. 22 8 However, in June 1995, he filed habeas petitions, first in
state and then in federal court, raising numerous claims which he
was litigating only to forestall his execution until the method used
to kill him would be changed so that he could be an organ
donor. 229 Despite Lonchar's long delay in seeking habeas relief,
the district court held that Habeas Corpus Rule 9,230 not some
generalized equitable authority to dismiss governed the case, and

225. Gray, 116 S. Ct. at 2082-83. The majority did remand the case for
the Court of Appeals to determine whether the misrepresentation claim had
been properly raised. Id.
226. 116 S. Ct. 1293 (1996).
227. Id. at 1295-96.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1296. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994). Federal Habeas Corpus
Rule 9(a) provides:
Delayed petitions. A petition may be dismissed if it appears that the
state of which the respondent is an officer has been prejudiced in its
ability to respond to the petition by delay in its filing unless the
petitioner shows that it is based on grounds of which he could not have
had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the
circumstances prejudicial to the state occurred.
Id. at 1300.
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it granted a stay of execution; the Eleventh Circuit vacated the
stay on equitable principles.231
The Supreme Court agreed unanimously that the Eleventh
Circuit should be reversed but disagreed as to why. Justice
Breyer, writing for five members of the Court, first held that as a
preliminary matter, if a district court cannot dismiss a petition on
the merits before the petitioner's scheduled execution, it is
obligated to address the merits and must issue a stay to prevent
the case from becoming moot on account of the petitioner's
execution. 232 On the central issue of whether the district court
possesses equitable authority to dismiss a last minute petition,
Justice Breyer relied on McCleskey v. Zant233 for the proposition
that over the years, equitable principles governing habeas corpus
have been formalized into statutes, rules, and well-established
Supreme Court precedents, and thus equitable considerations not
encompassed in these sources may no longer serve as the basis
for rejection of a habeas petition. 234 He further emphasized that
arguments against ad hoc departure from settled rules are
particularly strong when dismissal of a first habeas petition is at
issue; such a dismissal is especially serious because it denies the
petitioner the protections of the Great Writ entirely. 23 5 He
pointed out that the Habeas Corpus Rules allow district courts
ample discretionary authority to tailor the proceedings to dispose
quickly, efficiently, and fairly of first habeas petitions that lack
substantial merit, but that in cases of delay, Rule 9(a), in contrast
to Rule 9(b), which allows for the dismissal of a successive
petition as an "abuse of the writ, requires a showing of prejudice

231. Id. The district court, in granting a stay to allow time to consider the

state's other grounds in its motion to dismiss the petition, held that Lonchar's
six year delay in filing the federal habeas petition "could not constitute an

independent basis for rejecting the petition." Id. The Eleventh Circuit vacated
the stay, holding that the scope of the evaluation of the federal habeas petition
should extend beyond an analysis of Rule 9. Id.
232. Id. at 1296-97.
233. 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
234. Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1301-02.
235. Id. at 1302.
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236
to the state before a first habeas petition may be dismissed.
Justice Breyer concluded that Rule 9 itself thus represents the
drafters' balancing of the interests, and any equitable
considerations not embodied in the rule cannot provide a district
237
court with authority to circumvent the prejudice requirement.
The Chief Justice, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas, agreed that a stay should have been issued but he argued
that precedent established that district courts could consider the
eleventh hour nature of a request for a stay of execution even as
to a first habeas petition.238
For those who rejoiced over the Court's sensitivity in Lonchar
to the history of the Great Writ and to its special importance to
first-time habeas seekers, the celebration is short-lived. In the
Antiterrorism Act, Congress has enacted time limitations for the
bringing of habeas petitions and has thereby obviated the type of
239
problem that confronted the Court in Lonchar.
In sum, the Court's most interesting turn was its altered course
in the forfeiture cases, which signaled a meaningful change in the
government's favor. When one plugs the forfeiture cases change
into the remainder of the Court's criminal rulings this term, a
more general pattern similar to the last few terms emerges. The
Court is substantially enlisted on the side of government in the
battle against crime. However, one interesting aspect of the past
term is that the Court's work in the criminal field ceded center
stage to Congress, which passed two major pieces of criminal

236. Id. at 1300-02. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994).

Federal Habeas Corpus

Rule 9(b) provides in pertinent part: "A second or successive petition may be
dismissed if ... the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert [the
grounds raised] in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ." Id.
237. Id. at 1300.
238. Id. at 1304-07 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
239. See Antiterrorism Act § 105. The act amends § 2244 (d)(1) by
imposing a I year period of limitation running from certain specified dates,
and with regard to capital cases, the Act amends § 2254 by specifying that a
habeas petition "must be filed in the appropriate district court not later than
180 days after final State court affirmance of the conviction and sentence on
direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review," with
appropriate tolling provisions for certiorari and state collateral review
proceedings.
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legislation, the Antiterrorism Act and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act. 240 In Felker, the Court has already been exposed to
various provisions of the Antiterrorism Act. In the future, I am
certain that it will have to deal with other provisions of that Act
and with the host of issues raised by the Prison Litigation Reform
Act. Nonetheless, in terms of the Court's criminal law rulings, it
was a vintage year for government. Next year probably will not
be very different. Thank you.

240. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (1996).
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